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After the violent conflict in the 1990s, between 25,000 and 30,000 persons were
missing in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), their fates and whereabouts unknown.
Solving the missing-persons issue, and thus reducing some of the damages of the
conflict, has been important in the aftermath crisis management and has been
considered a prerequisite to prevent recurrences. Two of the latest developments in
these efforts are the adoption of the Law on Missing Persons in October 2004 and
the establishment of a state-level institution, the Missing Persons Institute (the MPI
BiH) in August 2005. This article examines the missing-persons issue from a risk
management and societal safety perspective aimed at creating resilient societies.
The state is regarded as a key actor, even when other actors are involved and
considered co-responsible. Especially important is the state’s ability to establish
public confidence in critical social institutions and to build mutual trust among
different groups within the population. Based on empirical data, the article
explores risk factors and dynamics that may threaten the MPI BiH’s ability to
contribute to societal safety in a society that has run into what is conceptualized as
a social trap. To get out of this trap, parties who profoundly distrust one another
will need to cooperate. Explicit as well as implicit objectives, competing
rationalities, and perceptions of reality among key actors are discussed. The
article also considers how the emotional overrules the rational, how the
predominantly ethnic discourse in society overpowers the weaker human-rights
discourse, and how this may threaten the important building of confidence and
trust.
Keywords: ethnic conflict, missing persons, societal safety, social traps, trust
and distrust
Introduction
The Balkan wars of the 1990s were a complex crisis developing along the lines of ethnic
division and polarization. In Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH1), the Dayton Peace Agreement
of 1995 put an end to violence but also essentially cemented the divisions and
demographic patterns established in BiH during the war, splitting the country in two
autonomous territorial and administrative entities. At war’s end, an estimated 30,000
persons were missing, and their fates and whereabouts unknown. Resolving the
missing-persons issue, and thereby mitigating the damage caused by the violent
ethnonational conflict, has played an important role in the aftermath crisis manage-
ment. Investigations of mass graves and subsequent identification of the exhumed
mortal remains have been conducted at a scale so far unparalleled in the world, and
the results are also unparalleled. Since 1997, assisted by the International
Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), entity-level commissions on missing persons
and local authorities have conducted recovery and repatriation operations of victims of
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their own ethnicities on each other’s territory—the so-called Joint Exhumation Process
(JEP). This arrangement, however, upheld a division along the lines of ethnicity; true
cooperation has been difficult, and has involved harsh mutual accusations of deliberate
obstructionism on both sides.
Two of the latest efforts to change this pattern are the adoption in October 2004 of
the Law on Missing Persons, detailing the rights of family members of missing persons
as well as the duties of state authorities,2 and the establishment of a state-level
institution, the Missing Persons Institute of Bosnia and Herzegovina (MPI BiH), as
one of the provisions of this law.3 This institution was co-founded by the Council of
Ministers of BiH and the ICMP in August 2005.4 It will merge the two previously
existing entity-level commissions, the Federal Commission on Missing Persons
(Federal Commission) and the Office for Tracing Detained and Missing Persons of
the Republika Srpska (RS Office), and take over their work, staff, and duties. Through
representation in an advisory board, families of missing persons will get a formal role
in the process. The stated objective of the MPI BiH is to speed up the process and
increase the efficiency of activities related to establishing the fate and whereabouts of
missing persons by centralizing and coordinating all efforts in one body. A highly
important task will be the creation of a unique and rigorously verified Central Record
of Missing Persons in BiH (CEN BiH).5 The crux is that in accordance with the Law on
Missing Persons, all activities are to be carried out exclusive of ‘‘any form of
discrimination, including sex, race, skin colour, language, religion, political or other
beliefs, national and social origin, inclusion in a national minority group, property
status, age, mental or physical disability, status acquired by birth, or any other
status’’6—whether among the missing or among their family members. By lifting these
activities up from the entity level to the state level, one is basically trying to replace a
predominantly ethnic discourse (focusing on collective ethnonational interests based
on perceived group characteristics) that also affects the missing-persons issue with a
human-rights discourse (focusing on the needs and rights of individuals) and to foster
intergroup trust through institutional intergroup cooperation. A further goal is to draw
the attention and awareness of political parties to resolving the issue rather than
abusing and manipulating it as a convenient means to other political ends.
This article addresses the issue from the perspectives of risk management and
societal safety, focusing on the importance of trust and trustworthiness in discussing
factors that may put at risk the MPI BiH’s ability to change the prevailing discourse,
create confidence in its work, and build trust among the families of the missing across
ethnonational dividing lines. In doing so, it takes into consideration the external
pressures from a society still characterized by institutionalized polarization along
ethnonational lines, attended by profound interethnic distrust and widespread denial
or strongly biased interpretations of what happened during the war and further
exacerbated by the dominance of chauvinistic nationalist partisan politics. The article
is based on a study of a process that is still under way; it primarily covers the
implementation period of the MPI BiH, from the drafting of the Law on Missing
Persons and the protocol for establishing the institute, starting in 2003, to its coming
into full functionality (in terms of having a full staff and steering functions in place,
ready to proceed to operation), from 2008 onward.
Methods
The findings presented in the article are based on a critical review of a variety of
sources, analyzed for their content in accordance with the principles of historical
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source criticism. Source categories taken into account are related empirical studies
and research reports; official and semi-official documents; internal reports by key
institutions; English press summaries by ICMP of articles related to the missing-
persons issue in Bosnian-Herzegovinian written news media from December 2004
through 2007; ICMP press releases from 2003 through 2007, usually carried in full text
or reported on by a number of local media; qualitative interviews with key actors
relevant to the missing-persons issue, conducted in June 2005 and November/
December 2006; field conversations; and participant and non-participant observation
data.
Field trips to BiH included a three months’ secondment to the ICMP as an
archaeologist—my original profession—in 2005, through the Norwegian Resource
Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM).7 This trip made me realize that
although forensic science is a tremendously important and indispensable contributor,
perfecting the forensic sciences is not the main key to resolving the missing-persons
issue in BiH. In 2006 and 2007, I spent a total of two-and-a-half months doing research
in BiH, during which time, in addition to conducting interviews, I had the opportunity
to engage in field conversations and make observations on the interactions among key
actors by attending and/or participating in various events such as exhumations,
commemorations, burials, conferences, and everyday work situations. Key actors more
formally interviewed were the head of BiH’s Department for Protection of Human
Rights at the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees (MHRR); the then chair of the
MPI Board of Directors; nine leadership representatives of Bosniak, Croat, and Serb
missing-person family associations and/or their umbrella organizations, four of whom
are also members of the MPI BiH Advisory Board; and the director of the ICMP’s Civil
Society Initiatives Department. All interviews were conducted face to face, those with
Bosnian-Herzegovinians with the help of interpreters.8 Two were unstructured
interviews; the rest were semi-structured, based on an interview guide discussed
in detail with the interpreters.
The press summaries used total about 5,600 individual entries, predominantly
from the daily newspapers Dnevni avaz, Dnevni list, Glas Srpske, Nezavine novine,
and Oslobod¯enje; the weekly magazines Slobodna Bosna and DANI; the online news
agency FENA; and the online Bosnia Daily.9 Frequently these entries are accompanied
by a comment that the same news was carried by other named local news media as
well. The press summaries cover the whole spectrum of the missing-persons issue:
exhumations, DNA identification issues, anniversaries and reports on people missing
after specific war events, commemorations, burials, opinions and statements by key
actors, reactions to court procedures, problems concerning witnesses, and so on. About
450 entries directly cover the Law on Missing Persons and/or the MPI BiH. As a source
on the character of the public discourse in BiH around this issue, they are invaluable.
Theoretical Perspectives
Societal Safety and the Necessity of Trust and Trustworthiness
In a white paper to the Norwegian Parliament in 2002, the concept societal safety
was defined as ‘‘the ability society has to maintain critical societal functions, protect
the life and health of the citizens and meet their basic requirements in a variety
of stress situations.’’10 The focus is on preventing undesirable events, characterized
by extraordinary stresses and losses and occurring in complex and interdependent
systems, that undermine trust in vital social functions. Societal safety further involves
an ability to reduce the damage done by such events when they do nonetheless occur
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and to establish normal conditions as soon as possible after such events. Even when
other actors are involved and are considered co-responsible, the state is regarded as a
key actor and the ultimate guarantor of societal safety, the very idea of which rests on
a precautionary principle and aims to create a society that is essentially resilient to
various intentionally as well as unintentionally imposed threats and dangers.
Especially important is the state’s ability to establish and maintain public confidence
in critical social institutions and to build mutual trust among different groups within
the population.11
Of course, this is a far easier task in a society like Norway’s—where the levels of
generalized trust are the highest in the world,12 where people have fair reason to trust
their institutions, and where the undesirable events so far encountered have never
caused a complex emergency, defined by a ‘‘total or considerable break down of
authority resulting from internal or external conflict’’ requiring ‘‘an international
response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the
ongoing United Nations country program’’13—than in a society that has experienced a
complex emergency and where, in consequence, trust in both authorities and other
individuals and groups within society has been fundamentally undermined.
Violent ethnonational conflicts are complex political and humanitarian crises. This
type of crisis often has a long incubation period, characterized by escalating tensions
and unresolved conflicts that may turn into repeated violent incidents before it reaches
the peak of full-blown armed conflict and becomes a complex emergency. They are also
slow-burning crises characterized by profound long-term consequences closely
interrelated with other dimensions of the crisis. Handling these consequences is one
of the major challenges in the aftermath of a complex crisis. The boundaries between
conflict and post-conflict are blurred; ‘‘post-conflict’’ is a misleading term, as conflict is
often continued by other means after arms have been laid down, and hence in the
aftermath one can expect ‘‘crises after the crisis.’’14 If issues at the root of the conflict
are not adequately addressed, the vicious circle may very well start over again—even
after a protracted period. The way one chooses to manage the aftermath makes a
difference to whether or not society proceeds towards sustainable peace.
This choice cannot be seen independently of the conditions that one desires
should characterize future society (i.e., be the normal conditions of society). As these
definitely should not be the same as those that led society toward massive human-
rights abuses, in the aftermath, society will be in transition, plowing unfamiliar
ground in its efforts to establish rather than reestablish order, to build rather than
rebuild society. In such a society, societal safety is not about improving by degrees an
already existing safety but about creating that safety it from scratch. However,
strengthening societal safety in the larger society and in local communities, even by
degrees, is an important goal that may help diminish the threat of the vicious circle’s
beginning again. If societal safety is to be sustainable, there are no alternatives to
the state assuming its responsibilities.15 Even if the presence of the international
community and of international relief organizations may be needed for years after
war’s end, the incorporation of local knowledge, resources, institutions, and self-
organized victim groups is paramount to achieve this goal of societal safety
successfully.
Societal safety must be created from within the affected society itself, from the top
down and from the bottom up simultaneously, in order to establish a sustainable
institutional and organizational framework and ensure a broad-based commitment to
and a collective sense of ownership of both the problems and, not least, their
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resolution. From a public planning perspective, the first is usually sought by applying
an instrumental rationality that is top-down, benchmarking and document oriented,
focusing on long-term objectives to govern short-term goals. Problem solving is viewed
as a sequential, linear process. Ideally, one analyzes the problem at hand, benchmarks
the alternative solutions and their consequences, chooses the best option, implements
it, and thus achieves the preferred result. This is the kind of rationality that usually
characterizes the ideal Weber bureaucrat, the professional administrator, and the
scientific expert; it is supposed to be efficient and expedient and to create a foundation
for the qualities that promote trust in institutions. The second is supposedly achieved
through applying a communicative rationality, which is process oriented and
consensus seeking and which may thus promote intergroup trust. It is sometimes
conceptualized as a bottom-up process that provides everyone involved with a feeling of
ownership of the chosen solution. In principle, decisions are reached through open
dialogue among all stakeholders in the case. Ideally, all stakeholders are honest and
sincere, fully and equally informed, and equally capable of attending to their interests
and making themselves heard, and have equal influence on the outcome.16
Trust as Social Capital
Ever since Robert Putnam, in an empirical study of what makes democracy work in
Northern Italy, coined the concept of trust as social capital brought about
predominantly by extensive public engagement in civil society networks,17 trust as a
social mechanism has become the topic of extensive research within the social sciences.
Regardless of whether trust is conceptualized as a cognitive, psychological, or moral
property of individuals, social relationships, or the social system itself, social trust is
widely believed ‘‘to promote democratization, economic investments and growth,
responsive and well-performing institutions, low levels of violence and other criminal
behavior, as well as individual health and personal happiness.’’18 A main reason for
this is that by fostering dialogue and mutual cooperation, social trust reduces the
transaction costs involved in human interaction—that is, it reduces the costs and
efforts of rule enforcement, whether through legal or social sanctions, and the
additional costs of elaborate control systems, whether formal or informal. As Bo
Rothstein points out, like other kinds of capital, physical or human, social capital
should be viewed as an asset possessed by individuals, organizations, and societies.19
Rothstein suggests that social capital has both quantitative and qualitative
dimensions, the quantitative dimension being an actor’s number of social relationships
and the qualitative being the quality of trust in these relationships. Social capital,
however, differs from physical capital, and to some degree from human capital, in that
it grows with use, cannot be bought, and is difficult to measure. In this connection it is
important to remember that capital can be invested both wisely and unwisely, that
only wisely invested capital yields a good return, and that to invest at all, start-up
capital is required.
This has implications for society’s ability to establish and maintain societal safety.
A person cannot feel safe in society if he or she has little or no trust in those responsible
for this safety. Hence, these social institutions need to develop their assets of
credibility and trustworthiness. Institutional trust refers to trust in the functioning of
organizational, institutional, and social systems. According to Daniel Metlay, this kind
of trust rests on ‘‘two distinctly different components or dimensions: (1) a tightly
interconnected and intertwined set of affective beliefs about institutional behaviour,
and (2) how competent the institution appears to be.’’20 Affective elements are openness
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(all relevant, unclassified information is provided to the public), reliability and
consistency (sincere commitment and genuine effort to keep promises), integrity and
honesty (actions consistent with words and not unduly influenced by politics),
credibility (facts not distorted), fairness (commitment to impartiality and acting
in good faith), and caring and concern for the broad public interest (listening to the
public); whereas competence is measured by the possession of the necessary skills to
carry out the work and a first-class staff.21 These are exactly the qualities called for by
representatives of the families of missing persons as a condition for them to trust the
authorities and the work of the MPI BiH: transparency, accountability, predictability,
impartiality, and strong inclusion of their own participation in the process;
professionalism, efficiency, and deliverability. The crux of the matter, however, is
not whether an institution actually possesses these qualities but whether it is
perceived to possess them by those who depend on its work. Of course, the first is a
prerequisite for the second, but the second does not automatically follow from the first.
Both need constant attention and maintenance.
Getting into Social Traps
BiH appears to have run into what Bo Rothstein conceptualizes as a social trap:
‘‘a situation where individuals, groups or organisations are unable to cooperate owing
to mutual distrust and lack of social capital, even where cooperation would benefit
all.’’22 His notion of social traps builds upon the work of John Platt, who coined the
concept in 1973 and identified various types of traps and reinforcement mechanisms.23
Among these are collective traps, prisoner’s dilemma situations in which opposing
parties tend to lock into either steady cooperation or steady conflict with each other.
Rothstein points to the cognitive side of game theory and claims that human action is
not a result of aloof, rational utility maximization but a strategic answer to
anticipations of how other actors are going to act: ‘‘Efficient cooperation for common
purposes comes about only if people trust that most other people will also choose to
cooperate.’’24 In the absence of that trust, the social trap will slam shut, worsening the
state of affairs for everyone. People are not perfectly informed, strictly rational,
memory-free automatons; they cannot rationally decide to forget treacherous and
deceitful behavior. What is perceived as a rational choice of action is entirely context
dependent and builds upon prior experiences with other actors, socially, historically,
and culturally.25 A related explanation of how social traps become stable is provided by
Joel Bruckner and Jeffrey Z. Rubin’s concept of entrapment: ‘‘a decision making
process whereby individuals escalate their commitment to a previously chosen, though
failing, course of action in order to ‘make good’ on prior investments.’’26 They fall into
the ‘‘sunk cost fallacy’’ of failing to exclude already made, irretrievable investments
when making decisions about future investments.
Like many other important concepts in human relations, trust is so multifaceted
that any attempt to pin it down must leave out important aspects. At the core of the
concept, however, is the relationship between an actor (A) who trusts and one who is
trusted (B), and a willingness to become vulnerable to the behavior of others who can
and may harm you. Russell Hardin wants us to include a third clause in the definition,
the matter (C) with regard to which one actor trusts another: trust is based on an
assessment of the trustworthiness of the other in relation to a specific matter.27 In his
encapsulated interest model of trust, Hardin more specifically claims that this
assessment is based on the degree to which the interests of the trusting party are
perceived to be encapsulated in the interests of the trusted party. This requires an
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ongoing relationship between the two; hence, in his conception, trust is strictly a
person-to-person matter. Consequently, Hardin discards the concepts of generalized
trust and trust in government as contradictions in terms.
However, as Rothstein points out, interpersonal trust relationships are governed
by more than a self-interest-optimizing type of rationality, and interpersonal trust is
also fundamentally different in character from institutional trust.28 Actors can be
collectives as well as individuals, and, even though collectives must ultimately operate
through the individual, there is a distinct difference between individual and collective
rationality. It is a collective action to construct efficient institutions, that is,
institutions that enable trust and confidence to be established in organizations and
societies and that reduce the transaction costs between parties with a mutual interest
in interacting in repeated sequences—even if they have conflicting interests in the
specific transactions. Social capital is generated predominantly by the existence of
universal political institutions, rather than by a vibrant civil society. Rothstein
underscores the distinction between representative (policy making) and executive
(policy implementing) democratic institutions.29 Whereas the main idea behind
representational political institutions is partisanship and legitimate competition
between conflicting interests, the main idea behind policy-implementing institutions is
impartiality: fairness in procedures, equal treatment before the law, incorruptibility,
non-discrimination, transparency, and so on. The latter are the institutions with which
ordinary citizens have the most frequent contact, and the ones that generate social
trust. In line with Metlay, Rothstein furthermore claims that people’s experience of
procedural justicematters as much as the final results of their interactions with public
institutions.30 This way of viewing the causal mechanisms behind the production of
social capital shifts the responsibility for creating a viable democratic society from
citizens to political and implementing authorities, in line with the above conception of
societal safety: the state holds the main responsibility. The core function of a vibrant
civil society, then, we may instead see as that of a watchdog. Social distrust that builds
on a realistic public assessment of government failures and the imperfections of
democratic institutions is a healthy social-control mechanism that may be just as
important as social trust to the well-functioning society. As Paul Slovic points out, it is
when the balance between trust and distrust becomes badly skewed toward
unreasonable distrust that systems start to malfunction.31
The risk and vulnerability aspects of trust help to explain why actors continue to
be trapped. Using a risk perspective, I define trust as an investment of positive
expectations in the future conduct of others with no a priori certainty that these
expectations will be met and reciprocated rather than violated. To decide whether or
not to opt for trust, people make a risk assessment of the situation; in so doing, they
rely on their experience with other actors’ previous behavior and/or on what they
believe they know about them, while carefully monitoring their present behavior for
clues to their future intentions. The knowledge people believe they have about
other actors may be false, or may build on imperfect information, but they will still
act upon it. Getting this risk assessment right is essential, as trust bestowed on the
untrustworthy can be disastrous. When people have experienced the hard way
precisely how disastrous it can be to trust people or institutions that cannot be
trusted—whether ethnic others, government, or the international community—they
may understandably become risk averse, letting suspicion and generalized distrust
become their default option. Unfortunately, this may have a self-reinforcing effect.
Toshio Yamagishi has found that low trusters are more often wrong in their
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assessments of the trustworthiness of others than high trusters are; when they are
wrong, they become disappointed and react by withdrawing. As social intelligence is
acquired through extensive interaction with others, this creates a vicious circle of
distrust and insufficient social intelligence.32
Getting Out of Social Traps
In BiH, the start-up capital for restoring lost trust, replacing the ethnic discourse with
a human-rights discourse, and get out of the social trap is minimal. Nevertheless, if
one can succeed in doing this within one institution—such as the MPI BiH—this
success may have positive synergetic effects on the rest of society. Unfortunately, as
there is no universal consensus on precisely how trust is produced, there exists no
plain and unambiguous model for how to change a state of profound distrust into a
state of reasonable trust, either at the interpersonal level or at the institutional level.
Understanding the mechanisms of the social trap, as outlined above, may provide
some guidance on finding the means to get out of such a trap. A few more aspects of
trust, outlined below, may also come in useful: (1) two interrelated dichotomies, the
conception of divisive/compatible ethnic entrepreneurs and that of bridging and
bonding social capital; and (2) the concept of an asymmetry between trust and distrust,
the notion that trust and formal control systems may be mutually reinforcing, and the
possibility that trust may be both cause and effect.
In a study seeking to explain the rapid disintegration of the former Yugoslavia,
Murat Somer defines divisive ethnic entrepreneurs as social-political entrepreneurs
who advocate ethnic separation and exclusiveness, whereas compatible ethnic
entrepreneurs are social-political entrepreneurs who advocate ethnic inclusiveness.33
They constantly compete to shift the public discourse through reputational cascade
effects by mobilizing a critical mass of people to publicly embrace a specific discourse.
Self-reinforcing reputational pressures on individuals who fail to conform may
then create cascades of interdependent choices that move society from one equilibrium
to another. The more people depend on their group membership for social status,
the more responsive they will be to reputational pressures; the more one-sided the
‘‘group view’’ is, the more compelling it becomes to conform, and the more difficult it
becomes to dissent. This may lead people to publicly either downplay or exaggerate
their private beliefs. Somer defines public discourse as the collection of views, beliefs,
values, and cultural-political preferences that people feel comfortable expressing
publicly, where they cannot control their audience, and private discourse as those
they feel comfortable expressing exclusively in familiar settings, where they can
control their audience. Public expressions of trust in ethnic others may differ
considerably from people’s private trust; hence, the public discourse is a poor predictor
of private trust in ethnic others. Still, people will draw their information about ethnic
others from the public discourse, which will, over time, influence private levels of trust
as well.
Somer claims that one’s trust in ethnic others depends on one’s level of
involvement in cross-group relationships and on how beneficial that interethnic
cooperation is. This brings us to Putnam’s conception of the ‘‘bridging’’ (inclusive) and
‘‘bonding’’ (exclusive) dimensions of social capital that develop in social networks.34
Bridging social capital builds on weak ties transcending salient social cleavages; it
facilitates self-organized networking and cooperation between people who are different
from each other and promotes intergroup trust. However, not all self-organized civil
groups produce intergroup trust. On the contrary, many networks develop from strong
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ties based on a common denominator, bonding their members in mutual support of
each other, at the same time making them focus inward. This produces strong intra-
group trust, but it may simultaneously produce strong intergroup distrust. Rothstein
calls this the ‘‘Hell’s Angels Syndrome.’’35 As Mark Baskin and Paula Pickering point
out, it is also characteristic of extreme nationalist organizations that are ‘‘hierarchi-
cally structured, and willing to use violence to realize their exclusivist goals.’’36
However, in an antagonistic ethnonationalistic environment, even less extreme mono-
ethnic organizations split along ethnic lines may be in danger of developing exclusivist
bonding social capital. According to Pickering, high levels of bonding social capital may
threaten democracy by providing increased opportunities for divisive ethnic entrepre-
neurs.37 To support positive interethnic relations, organizations and institutions need
to be ethnically diverse and acquaintance based, allow for individual norms, help
people address practical matters that require repeated mutually dependent interac-
tion, be rooted in local culture, and be difficult for people to avoid.
Slovic’s asymmetry principle posits that trust is asymmetrically related to distrust
in favor of the latter.38 First, the balance between trust and distrust is very easily
disturbed because of certain psychological mechanisms. Trust is fragile, difficult to
build, and easily destroyed; lost trust and confidence are even harder to restore
than they are to build in the first place. Distrust, on the other hand, is easy to acquire
and hard to overcome. Whereas trust building is incremental, the destruction of
trust is instant. Second, distrust tends to reinforce and perpetuate itself, for two
reasons: distrust tends to inhibit the kinds of contacts and experiences that are
necessary to overcome distrust; and trust and distrust color our interpretations of
events, thus reinforcing prior beliefs. As James G. March and Johan P. Olsen found in
their study on organizational learning, distrust makes people avoid interaction with,
oppose anything coming from, and tend to attribute all detrimental events to the
distrusted actor.39 Third, trust-destroying events are more visible and carry greater
weight than trust-building events; they are given more attention, both by individuals
and by the media, than trust-building events, which are often fuzzy and indistinct.
Trust-destroying news is also perceived as more credible than trust-building news.
Finally, problematic events increase distrust far more than favorable events decrease
it. It may be wise, then, to pay as much attention to distrust and trust-destroying
factors as to trust and trust-building factors—if not more. If the point of departure is
a state of distrust, lack of distrust may be a more realistic first goal to achieve
than actual trust.
There are two main perspectives on the relationship between trust and formal
control. One is the substitution perspective, which holds the two to be inversely related;
the other is the complementary perspective, which holds them to be mutually
reinforcing. The latter is gaining more and more support. Along with T.K. Das and
Bing-Sheng Teng,40 Katinka Bijisma-Frankema and Ana Cristina Costa define formal
control as ‘‘a regulatory process by which elements of a system are made more
predictable through the establishment of standards in pursuit of some desired
objective or state.’’ It aims ‘‘at establishing task reliability by designing a set of rules
that specify an actor’s work and enforcing the actor’s compliance with these prescribed
standards.’’41 These authors claim that many of the benefits associated with trust—
open communication and information exchange, belief in information received,
increased perceptions of safety, commitment, mutual learning, attribution of positive
motives, and heightened levels of cooperation and performance—can also be associated
with modes of control. If the trust–control nexus really is positive, then ensuring task
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and behavior specifications and codification through formal control mechanisms may
be a good starting point for building trust.
Finally, the fact that trust may be both cause and effect—a consequence as much
as a precondition of what it produces42—means that the problem of trust can be
approached from the angle of its supposed effects. If trust lubricates cooperation but
cooperation also creates a basis for trust, and if the same applies to other positive
outcomes attributed to trust, then reluctant or even compulsory cooperation,
communication, and interaction may create a foundation from which trust can be
built. Opinions very much to the same effect were also expressed by several of my
interviewees, whose experience was that cooperation and interaction that they had
only reluctantly agreed to had changed, over time, into what they perceived as true
cooperation and mutual trust. They were convinced that the same would happen
within the MPI BiH.
Empirical Findings
Background: Trust Perceptions among the General Public in BiH
In 2003, Peter Ha˚kansson and Sarah Hargreaves conducted a comprehensive social
trust survey across BiH for the Balkans Analysis Group in Sarajevo.43 Since 2000, the
UNDP Early Warning System (UNDP EWS) in BiH, aiming to identify and predict
crisis and conflict, has produced quarterly summaries of the results of public opinion
polls, media and event monitoring, and official statistics.44 These surveys examine
what can be seen as expressions of different kinds of trust, at and between different
levels of society. In June 2005, UNDP EWS also conducted a special poll in connection
with the conference Pathways to Reconciliation and Global Human Rights, surveying
public opinions on transitional justice mechanisms.45 Together, these surveys provide
an empirical backdrop for the topic discussed here and indicate the general amount of
social capital present in BiH during the period under research.
From a generalized trust level of 26.9% found by the World Values Survey in
1998, Ha˚kansson and Hargreaves found that in 2003 the level had dropped to only
14.5%.46 Differences were huge across the eighteen regions of BiH examined, ranging
from 1.4% in Una-Sana Canton to 61.9% in West-Herzegovina Canton—the one
outlier that brings the overall level up to 14.5%.47 Most regions had a trusting
population far below this level. Many of the least trusting regions were those worst
affected by the war (which are also those having the greatest problems with missing
persons). Generalized trust was poorest among individuals aged between thirty-six
and fifty in 2003 (which is also the age group making up the majority of surviving
family members of missing persons). Not surprisingly, most people were particular-
ized or partial trusters (i.e., turning their trust toward ‘‘their own community’’).48
Respondents predominantly bestowed trust on family and relatives (ca. 85%). On a
descending scale, they trusted neighbors, other people well known to them, and
people of their own nationality. Least trusted were people of a different nationality or
with a different way of life. However, respondents who trusted some or all/most of
their own nationality would also trust some or all/most ethnic others. Still, 20%
trusted no ethnic others, and the category of outright distrusters—those who trust no
one at all—was also disturbingly large. A strong correlation was found between
spending time with ethnic others and trusting ethnic others. Even so, 37% seldom or
never spent time with ethnic others; among those who trusted no ethnic others,
the figure was 75%.
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According to the UNDP EWS special poll in 2005, about 60% of respondents had
felt their lives threatened during the war. For about 50%, the war still had a huge
negative impact on their everyday lives. About half of respondents considered everyone
victims of the war to a certain extent; Serbs held this opinion more often than Bosniaks
or Croats did. A great majority were in favor of criminal prosecution (96.7%), either of
anyone ‘‘who caused unjustifiable harm to others during the war’’ (64.9%) or only of
actual war criminals. A significant majority also believed that war criminals and war
crime suspects ‘‘should not work in public institutions or be allowed to influence their
operations’’ (72%). Still, most respondents had no great faith in the ability of either the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or the domestic
courts to secure criminal accountability.
With respect to institutional trust in general, Ha˚kansson and Hargreaves found
that trust in government was approximately 50% at both state and entity levels and
about 60% at the municipal level; respondents had somewhat more trust in the
executive bodies, the courts, the police, and the army. The 2003 EWS surveys were
generally in agreement with the Social Trust Survey.49 Since then, institutional trust
has steadily decreased, reaching an all time low by September 2005; thereafter there
has been a constant state of flux. However, even the highest peak of approval, by the
end of 2006, did not reach 2003 levels. This trend seems inversely correlated with a
steadily growing conviction that officials of the same institutions are either very or
quite considerably corrupt. By September 2007, about two-thirds of respondents
believed the same applied to governance structures at all levels, as well as to the police
and the courts (which got the ‘‘best’’ score, ca. 50%). International institutions such as
the Office of the High Representative (OHR),50 the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), the UNDP itself, and the European Union have fared
only somewhat better on both variables. In general, Bosniaks and Croats approved of
state-level governance structures more than Serbs did until the end of 2005, when the
pattern reversed. Bosniaks and Serbs also generally approve more of the governance
structures of their ‘‘own’’ entity than of those in the ‘‘other’’ entity; Croats fall between
the two with respect to both entities. Although two-thirds to three-quarters of
respondents basically or entirely disagree that ‘‘only ethnic parties can secure the
fundamental interests of the constituent peoples they represent,’’ people continue to
vote ethnonationalist parties into power. Those who vote, that is—voter turnout for the
general elections held in October 2002 and October 2006 was only about 50–55%. It
took six months to form the legislature after the 2002 elections, and four-and-a-half
months in 2006, which may be regarded as symptomatic of the general inefficiency of
political decision-making processes in BiH. At any given time, apart from minor surges
of optimism immediately following elections, at least half of respondents believe that
the political situation is only getting worse, and at least one-fifth fear that war will
break out again if international security forces are withdrawn.
The overall pattern is thus rather discouraging: trust of all kinds is low and has
decreased since war’s end, and the ethnic discourse, fueled by nationalistic, polarizing
partisan politics, is still the dominant public discourse.
Institutional Framework: The Law on Missing Persons of BiH
Supported by international organizations, notably the ICMP and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), families of missing persons have continually
pressed for government to accept its responsibility toward the missing and their
families. At the end of 2002, their persistence led the BiH Council of Ministers to
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charge the Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees (MHRR) with drafting a domestic
Law on Missing Persons. In March 2003, the ministry organized a roundtable
discussion with family-association representatives, who were also consulted through-
out the drafting process. A working group was established in May that included
representatives from the MHRR, the entity-level commissions on missing persons, the
entity and Brcˇko District governments, the ICMP, and the ICRC.51 The resulting law
was passed by the BiH legislative bodies in October 2004 and entered into force on 9
November 2004.52
The Law on Missing Persons addresses the social and economic rights of family
members of missing persons. The core right is the right to know and the related
obligation to provide information on the part of the state and entity authorities. The
right to know the fate and whereabouts of a missing person is codified by the Geneva
Conventions (1949) and their Additional Protocols (1977).53 In a study by the Office of
the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), this right has additionally been
declared an inalienable, non-derogable, and autonomous human right, linked to the
duty of the state to protect and guarantee human rights, conduct effective
investigations, and guarantee effective remedy and reparations.54 This right is now
also codified in the BiH Law on Missing Persons, which—by including families’ right to
know the circumstances, the cause of death, and the place of burial of a missing person
proved dead and their right to have the mortal remains of their relatives returned to
them actually goes further than international humanitarian law requires. In addition,
anybody, including foreign citizens, can file a tracing request.55 Other rights of
importance are the right to financial support and the related establishment of a fund
for support to families of missing persons; family members’ right to temporarily dispose
of the property of missing persons, even if the missing has not been proclaimed dead;
and a guarantee the tracing process will not be concluded until the mortal remains
have been found.56
The implementation of international law into domestic law in itself increases
societal safety, providing families with much stronger statutory protection and placing
much more concrete obligations on the state than would mere ratification of
international law. Although trust cannot be legislated into existence, law is an
important first step in fostering trust in institutions. Laws are normative; they show
the intentions of lawmakers and promise a certain level of commitment on their part.
In the BiH case, the law was not forced or imposed from the outside but resulted from a
negotiation process among domestic governance structures that have had great
difficulty in cooperating on other reforms. The process was conducted under the
auspices of a domestic political institution; it included the top officials of the executive
bodies concerned, the entity-level commissions on missing persons; and, although
definitely a top-down process, it included extensive public participation by the primary
stakeholders, the families of missing persons.57 From a social-safety perspective, it is
also important that the law so clearly stresses the state’s obligations as duty holder
and emphasizes the obligations of the so-called relevant authorities at the state, entity,
cantonal, and municipal levels to provide families and responsible institutions with all
available information and necessary assistance required to resolve the issue. These
bodies are furthermore instructed to cooperate unconditionally both amongst
themselves and with the ICMP, the MPI BiH, the ICRC, and the BiH Red Cross
Society.58 Although it took years to get the lawmaking process started, once underway
it was not excessively time consuming and should, overall, be deemed rather
successful: on important principles, by and large, the parties have agreed without
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major problems. Finally, via ICRC, the BiH Law on Missing Persons, a historical first,
may also come to influence societal safety in other countries struggling to deal with
large numbers of missing persons.59
Challenges at the Institutional Level
In order to make an impact, law needs to be implemented, operationalized, and
enforced—a far more difficult task than drafting the law itself, as it requires a vigor
and capacity that seem not to be present to the same extent as were the good
intentions. Part of the problem of implementing decisions in top-down processes in
hierarchical systems is to make them filter down the system from the strategic policy-
making level at the ‘‘blunt end’’ to the operational level at the ‘‘sharp end’’ of the
system.60 At each level, there will be several actors and stakeholders who have a
certain degree of freedom to make choices about the means of, and time for, action
and who will tend to meet local problems with local solutions. This applies particularly
to so complex a public management system as exists in BiH, where the individual parts
of the system are highly autonomous and are influenced to different degrees by the
ethnic discourse in society. Getting actors at various levels to interact dynamically
requires measures to secure information flow and feedback mechanisms between
them; but first and foremost it requires that they actually know about the decisions
they are expected to operationalize. Considering the emphasis laid on the obligations of
‘‘relevant authorities’’ at all levels, there is reason to ask how well aware ‘‘sharp end’’
authorities, public officials, and civil servants are of the demands made on them by the
Law on Missing Persons. In 2006, in cooperation with ICMP, ICRC, OHCHR, and the
BiH Centre for Free Access to Information (CSPI), the MHRR created a Guide for
Families of Missing Persons on the application of the law, in order to make it easier for
them to understand and exercise their rights.61 Family-association representatives,
however, report mixed experiences with the usefulness of this guide vis-a`-vis the
authorities. They point to a frequent lack of knowledge at all levels, including the state
level, about the very existence of the law, and suggest that a similar guide be created
for the relevant authorities, to raise their awareness about the law itself, what the
families need, and their own obligations in this connection.
Organizational Framework: The Missing Persons Institute of BiH
Originally proposed in 1998, a Missing Persons Institute was registered by the ICMP
with the Cantonal Court in Sarajevo in August 2000, in connection with the
responsibility for coordinating the Joint Exhumation Process (JEP) then being
handed over by the OHR.62 In June 2003, the BiH presidency agreed that the state
should become a co-founder and asked the Council of Ministers to establish a protocol
on a BiH Missing Persons Institute. In December, a working group led by the MHRR
and including representatives of the entity and Brcˇko District governments and of the
ICMP was charged with drafting the protocol. Representatives of the Federal
Commission, the RS Office, and the ICRC had observer status. In December 2004,
families of missing persons were informed of the status of the implementation of the
MPI; their representatives submitted their comments in mid-January 2005. An
agreed-upon version of the protocol was presented to the Council of Minister in
February and harmonized by the co-founders and the entity and Brcˇko District
representatives in April.63 Approved by the Council of Ministers on 5 August 2005, the
‘‘Agreement on Assuming the Role of Co-Founders of the Missing Persons institute of
Bosnia and Herzegovina’’ was officially signed by the co-founders on 30 August, the
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International Day of the Disappeared.64 The agreement was ratified on 28 December,
and the implementation of the MPI BiH as an independent state-level institution
began with the agreement’s publication in the BiH Official Gazette on 29 December
2005.65
The organizational structure of the MPI BiH is fairly complicated, consisting of one
structure for the permanent organization and one for a transitional phase (see
Figure 1). The permanent organization includes three management bodies—a three-
member Supervisory Board, a six-member Steering Board, and a three-member Board
of Directors—and the staff. The staff report to the Board of Directors, which reports to
the Steering Board, which reports to the founders; the Supervisory Board is a
reviewing body that reports to the two other management boards and to the founders.
In addition, an Advisory Board consisting of six family-association representatives
advises the management bodies and monitors the work of the MPI; members of the
Advisory Board have observer status on the Steering Board. The founders appoint
members of the Supervisory Board and the Steering Board by consensus, nominating
three members each to the Steering Board, which then appoints the Board of Directors
and the Advisory Board. Advisory Board members are nominated by BiH family
associations. All management-board appointments are to be based on professional
MINISTRY OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND 
REFUGEES
End of 2002
FAMILY 
ASSOCIATIONS
SUPERVISORY 
BOARD
1B, 1C, 1S
Dec 2006
LAW ON MISSING PERSONS
Nov. 2004
BiH CoM & ICMP
Co-founders
Aug.–Dec. 2005
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
(Fed. Commission & RS Office)
1B, 1C, 1S
Mar. 2006
INITIAL STAFF
(Fed. Com & RS Office)
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(End of 2007)
STEERING 
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Figure 1. The organizational structure of the Missing Persons Institute of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, including chronology of the implementation process
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qualifications pursuant to an open public competition. In the case of the Steering
Board and the Supervisory Board, a ranking of candidates is made by a selection
committee appointed by the founders in consultation with entity and Brcˇko District
governments; in the case of the Board of Directors, this process is carried out by the
Steering Board. All board members’ terms are fixed at four years. Members of the
management boards may not, and Advisory Board members cannot, be reappointed.
All board-member appointments must fulfill the constitutional principle of equal
ethnic representation of the constituent peoples of BiH (Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and
Bosnian Serbs). Chairs of the three management boards may not belong to the same
constituent people; the chair of the Board of Directors must rotate every eight months,
whereas no such requirements are made of the chairs of the two other boards. All
boards are to make decisions by consensus, requiring a minimum quorum of one
representative of each constituent people.
As a means of transition, the two co-chairs of the Federal Commission and the
director of the RS Office were to be appointed to the initial MPI Board of Directors for a
two-year term, after which the open competition for these positions would be held. This
was to happen within ninety days of the signing of the agreement (i.e., the end of
November 2005).66 Their staff were to be transferred to form the initial staff of the MPI
BiH. Bylaws to make possible the transfer of authority and competencies from the
entity-level commissions were to be in place by end of June 2006, and these
commissions were to cease their work by end of September 2006.67 No other strict
deadlines were set in the agreement, but by necessity the Steering Board would have
to be in place by the same time for the MPI BiH to begin functioning at full capacity.
The ICMP was to continue providing technical and expert assistance, but with time the
intention was to hand over equipment and other assets, apart from the DNA
laboratories, and then pull out by the end of 2007.68
The initial Board of Directors was appointed at the end of February 2006.69 Bylaws
on the transfer of authority and competencies were adopted in June (RS, amended
in October) and September (Federation of BiH) 2006, but their entry into force
depended on the full establishment of the MPI.70 Vacancy notices for the Steering
Board and the Supervisory Board were issued in August 2006; although the one for the
Supervisory Board had to be reissued in September because there were too few
applicants, members of the Supervisory Board were appointed in December 2006. In
contrast, despite the fact that a ranking of twenty-six qualified candidates was
forwarded to the co-founders by the end of September 2006, members of the Steering
Board were not appointed until June 2007.71 They formally appointed the Advisory
Board members in September 2007, and at the end of November 2007 the BiH Council
of Ministers finally adopted the steering documents needed for the MPI BiH to become
operational72—more than seven years after the original founding of the MPI by the
ICMP, four years after it was agreed that it should become a BiH institution, three
years after the Law on Missing Persons came into force, and more than a full year
behind the schedule laid out by the agreement.
Risks to Institutional Trust Building Produced by Role Conflicts
The MPI BiH nearly did not get off the ground in the first place, as a result of major
disagreements about the method of appointing the initial Board of Directors and
whether or not its members should be exempted from article 5 of the Law on Missing
Persons, whose application to implementation of the MPI the agreement specifically
underscores.73 This article states that ‘‘Officials with duties related to the tracing of
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missing persons cannot carry out this duty if they are members of steering and other
boards, or executive bodies, of political parties, or if they are politically engaged
representatives, and must not follow political party instructions.’’74 This became an
issue because in order to secure transfer of experience and not lose momentum, it
seemed natural to let the heads of the former entity-level commissions initially head
the MPI BiH as well. However, the Bosniak co-chair of the Federal Commission, Amor
Masˇovic´, was and is a delegate of the Bosniak Democratic Action Party (SDA) to the
House of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federation of BiH.75 Republika Srpska (RS)
politicians, the RS Office, and RS missing-persons family associations strongly opposed
Masˇovic´’s candidature, arguing partly on the principle that it was against both the
Law on Missing Persons and the Law on Conflicts of Interest and would bring ethnic
politics directly into a process that needs to be depoliticized,76 and partly ad
hominem.77 Masˇovic´ himself has chosen not to resign, either from his political position
or from the MPI BiH, claiming that there is no conflict of interest. The RS
organizations, however, have not been willing to leave the matter as it was temporarily
settled, by giving the issue a two-year respite, but have routinely repeated their
principled argument in almost every statement to the press about the MPI BiH. As the
term of the initial Board of Directors expired at the end of February 2008, the issue
was to be one of the first challenges presented to the Steering Board.78 With respect to
the principle of the matter, their worry is absolutely legitimate: the role of a politician
and the role of a public official are by definition incompatible and cannot be executed
simultaneously. Politicians are supposed to have agendas biased toward specific
interests; public officials are supposed to administer political resolutions impartially,
irrespective of their personal political preferences. Thus, from an institutional trust
perspective, the situation is unfortunate, to say the least.
Another mixing of roles that may have set back the building of institutional trust
involves the members of the initial Board of Directors and the fact that there has
been no clear distinction between their roles as heads of their respective entity-level
commissions and their roles as directors of the MPI BiH. People depending on the
public administration should not have to wonder who they are dealing with at any
given time; some predictability is required to enable people to trust their institutions
and public officials. It is confusing, and produces uncertainty about the whole
process, when the same persons make statements sometimes in one capacity and
sometimes in another. The limbo in which the initial Board of Directors found itself
for more than a year, between the appointment of its members and the appointment
of the Steering Board—and specifically after October 2006, when the entity-level
commissions did not cease to exist as planned—seems to have further exacerbated
this situation. Rather than appearing in the public discourse unanimously as a
collegium of directors, the Bosniak and Serb directors especially continued to
predominantly represent their respective entity-level commissions, opposing or
criticizing each other publicly even as late as November 2007.79 However, only
these incidents of non-cooperation made the news, whereas their cooperation on all
the bureaucratic tasks of preparing and agreeing on system designs, rules and
regulations, plans and budgets—essential to making the organization work as an
efficient, universal institution—simply has not been of interest to the media. The
same applies, of course, to the Working Group on Implementation of the Law on
Missing Persons, the Expert Group on Central Records of Missing Persons, and the
Expert Group on Excavation and Examination of Mortal Remains, in all of which
they have participated.80
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An Inherent Structural Dilemma: The Embedded Ethnic Discourse
As is apparent from even a glance at the organizational structure of the BiH MPI, the
ethnic discourse is incorporated in various ways into the organization itself. The
structure closely follows the governance principles laid down in the consociational
constitution, or group-based power-sharing system, of BiH, which was part of the
Dayton Peace Agreement.81 From Hardin’s trust perspective, such a system may be
characterized as being based on the collective presumption that the interests of one
ethnic group cannot possibly be encapsulated in the interests of other ethnic groups—
hence the need for proportionality in group representation and the demand for
consensus at every possible decision-making level. As Sumantra Bose points out, this
kind of system is essentially discriminatory, in that it recognizes some collective
identities to the exclusion of other possible identities and institutionally entrenches
the cleavages and divisions based on these identities.82 Furthermore, it prevents
the development of new collective identities. Such a system can work only if the will
and capacity for cooperation exist at the highest levels.
In BiH, access to power and position is restricted almost entirely to the so-called
constituent peoples—Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs—although some
access is also granted to the category of ‘‘others.’’ There exists no formal identity
category for those who want to identify themselves simply as Bosnian-Herzegovians,
and those BiH citizens who lost their former national identity as Yugoslavs have no
other option but to conform to the existing system of ethnic identities. The
organizational structure of MPI BiH, however, includes no representation of
the ‘‘others’’ category in its organizational structure. This became a factor in delaying
the appointment of the Steering Board.
Arguably, the selection committee began its work a little late to get the members
of the Steering Board appointed in good time before the October 2006 deadline,
which happened to coincide with the general elections. The delay in forming the
legislature after the election further postponed the process, and meant that the
ICMP had no real co-founding partner for an extended period. Pressed hard—for
example, at a meeting on 8 December 2006, organized by the MHRR and the ICMP
and attended by family-association representatives, the Board of Directors, and the
ICRC83—the outgoing Council of Ministers decided on their three nominees to the
Steering Board on 28 December 2006, at which point the ICMP also made public the
names of their three candidates.84 Because three of the candidates in the ‘‘Serb’’
group were of mixed ethnicity, the Council of Ministers did not, as agreed, choose
their candidates from the top of the ranking list. Publishing the names before having
officially agreed on the appointments was arguably a mistake in terms of intergroup
trust building. The person who had moved up the ladder to a nomination, the
president of the Union of Associations of Families of Missing and Captured Persons
of Republika Srpska in BiH (RS Union), immediately became the subject of harsh
public dispute. For example, rather than perceiving her nomination as an
opportunity to place an ally on the Steering Board, the Srebrenica family
associations strongly opposed her candidature, claiming that she showed no respect
for the victims of other nationalities—exactly the same type of claim that Serb
umbrella organizations make about other nationalities’ treatment of Serb victims.85
By the end of May 2007, the issue remained unresolved. Despite a proposal from the
Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees to appoint the three highest-ranked and the
three second-highest-ranked candidates—as was agreed from the beginning, and
became the solution in the end—other ministers requested that the selection process
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be annulled and a new one be undertaken.86 Had this happened, it would probably
have been a trust-building catastrophe.
The Right Holders: The Missing and Their Surviving Family Members
According to the Law on Missing Persons, a missing person is a person who, due
to the armed conflict in former Yugoslavia, went missing in or from BiH between
30 April 1991 and 14 February 1996,87 remains unaccounted for, and at the time of
disappearance was either a civilian or a member of the armed forces. According to the
ICRC, about 92% of such persons were male.88 Today, fourteen years after war’s end,
following the recovery of thousands of missing persons’ mortal remains from mass
graves, single graves, forest floors, and other environments, it is highly unlikely that
any significant number of the missing will be found alive.
As of today, nobody knows the exact number of missing persons. Until the ICRC
and ICMP databases are fully correlated, there is no way to determine exactly who is
in both and who is only in one or the other of these databases. Still others
may figure only on the lists of the former entity-level commissions, other entity-level
authorities, or family associations. It is unlikely, however, that anyone would falsely
uphold a tracing request for years, or would provide blood for identification of their
missing family members without reason. Therefore, the number of ICRC tracing
requests and the number of blood samples donated to ICMP represent a reliable basis
for calculating the minimum number of missing persons.89 As of 28 March 2008, 67,966
blood relatives had donated blood samples to the ICMP representing 23,022 missing
individuals.90 Through matching of DNA profiles obtained from bone samples with
DNA profiles obtained from blood samples, 11,230 individuals had been identified.91
At the same time, the number of unique DNA profiles obtained from bone samples
showed that 14,345 individuals were represented among the mortal remains. This
means that 3,115 missing persons had been found, recovered, and DNA-profiled for
whom there were no matching references, bringing the minimum number of the
missing up to 26,137. The ICMP’s estimate of about 30,000 missing persons in total is
thus a realistic figure.92
From a societal-safety perspective, the number of concern is not so much the
number of missing persons as the number of their surviving relatives. They are the
ones to whom the state now has a primary obligation to protect their life and health
and to meet their basic requirements. The state can restore missing persons’ dignity as
human beings, which in itself is a strong signal of societal safety to other members of
society; but it cannot give them back their life and health. It goes without saying that
the closest family members of the missing—whether blood relatives or affiliated
through marriage or cohabitation, the right holders according to the Law on Missing
Persons93—are the most deeply and directly affected members of society. Based on the
DNA statistics, on average we can count on three living blood relatives for each
missing person; adding those who are not related by blood, we will probably arrive at
close to 100,000 people whose lives have been turned completely upside down. Not only
were they bereaved of their loved ones, often under severely traumatic circumstances,
but their social and economic life situation also became highly insecure and unstable,
as in most cases the missing person was the main provider of the family. Because of the
uncertain civil status of their missing relative, their own civil status remained
unsettled. Until the passage of the Law on Missing Persons, problems concerning
property, insurance, inheritance, and so on could not be resolved unless family
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members were willing to proclaim their missing relatives dead and let the tracing
process stop.
Associations of Families of Missing Persons
Among so many people, we may safely assume that there will be all sorts of
personalities, with different capacities and coping capabilities. Admirably many have
found within themselves the resources to address their extremely difficult situation
and the stamina to continue doing so over many years, despite the magnitude of the
problems they have had to address and the emotional exhaustion and frustration this
causes. In order to search for their missing family members and pursue their legal and
human rights, approximately 40,000 family members of missing persons have
organized themselves into more than sixty family associations, almost all of them
registered NGOs.94 Because geographically specific events have typically been their
organizing principle, these associations are all mono-ethnic. Apart from one
association of families of missing Roma people, based in Tuzla and formed in 2003,
all are made up of families of missing Bosniaks, Croats, or Serbs. The first Bosniak and
Croat family associations were formed during the war, beginning in 1993; many were
formed in 1996, when Serb families also began associating under the umbrella of the
Republican Board of Families of Missing Persons (RS Board), a sub-organization of the
Republican Organization of Killed and Detained Soldiers and Missing Persons of
Republika Srpska (RS Organization). In 2002, a group of eight family associations
broke away from the RS Organization and created their own umbrella organization,
the Union of Associations of Families of Missing and Captured Persons of Republika
Srpska in BiH (RS Union). A year before, in 2001, twelve Bosniak family associations
had also created an umbrella organization, the Union of Bosniak Associations of
Families of Captured and Missing Persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosniak
Union), from which one association, the Association of Women from Prijedor ‘Izvor,’
later broke away. A number of other family associations—Serb, Bosniak, and Croat—
are free-standing, the Croat associations, however, cooperating as if an umbrella
organization existed. Also the family associations of victims of the Srebrenica Genocide
are free-standing but bound together in a non-formalized cluster, at the core of which
are the Women of Srebrenica, the Mothers of Srebrenica and Zˇepa Enclaves, the
Srebrenica Mothers, and the Mothers of Srebrenica and Podrinje.
In 1998, the ICMP began actively supporting family associations in their efforts to
advocate for their interests, through activities pertaining to four main areas:
empowerment, networking, awareness building, and promotion of mutual under-
standing—for example, by providing grants for various activities initiated by the
family associations themselves. Over the years, the ICMP’s Civil Society Initiatives
Department has organized a large number of workshops, seminars, and roundtables
for family-association representatives of both mono-ethnic groups and groups of mixed
ethnicity, both in BiH and across the former Yugoslavia. BiH family associations have
participated in the annual Regional Networking Conferences on the Issue of Missing
Persons in the Former Yugoslavia, organized by the ICMP since 1998, at which family-
association representatives have come together to discuss common issues and had the
opportunity to directly address invited representatives of their respective responsible
national authorities. At the eighth such conference in 2005, family-association
representatives decided to form a regional coordination board in order to jointly
promote their common goals. This board constitutes an additional basis for developing
bridging social capital and for strengthening the human-rights discourse. However, a
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sub-regional coordination board of Serb family associations, created simultaneously
to make this coordination process easier, instead developed strong bonding social
capital based on the ethnic discourse. On a couple of occasions this has led to their
withdrawing from planned joint activities, in consequence of which they have lost the
trust of other family-association representatives.95
In BiH, family-association representatives have been dissatisfied with the status
and position given to the Advisory Board in the organizational structure of the MPI
BiH, which they perceive as ‘‘their’’ institute. They wanted the Advisory Board to be
appointed by the founders, so as to be on par with the Steering Board; and if not on par,
they wanted, as a minimum, more than just an observer role on the Steering Board.
They wanted to have real decision-making power, rather than, in the words of one
representative, ‘‘only give recommendations, suggestions, advice, and proposals,
[which] doesn’t oblige anyone to accept it.’’ They feel a strong need to be in control,
derived from their distrust in the ability and will of the authorities to cooperate in the
interests of all nationalities. They consider themselves much better at cooperating
than the responsible authorities, and more willing to embrace the discourse of human
rights.
There are, however, limits to the public participation of right-holder groups.
As right holders, families of missing persons cannot be charged with duty-holder
obligations; they cannot be made responsible for providing themselves with their own
rights. From the point of view of the implementing authorities, the families have been
included as far as is feasible throughout the drafting and implementation process.
These authorities perceive the formal role that family representatives will have,
through the Advisory Board, as important and far-reaching;96 ‘‘the Advisory Board will
monitor the work of the Institute and will essentially be its watchdog.’’97 This role may
be a challenge in itself. Given the requirement of reaching decisions by consensus,
members of the Advisory Board may be expected to act as a unit; furthermore, they will
have to represent not just the associations or umbrella organizations from which
they are recruited but all families and family associations of missing persons in BiH
who have no direct representation on the Advisory Board. So far, they have
no organizational system for obtaining information and opinions from these other
associations, or vice versa. There must have been talk at some point of forming a joint
BiH union of family associations, however, since in 2005 the president of the RS Union
told a newspaper that her organization did not agree with establishing such a body.98
Thus, apart from the interim Advisory Board, which existed for some years before it
was officially appointed in autumn 2007, there has been no systematic attempt among
the families to coordinate a common strategy toward the authorities.
Challenges to the Discourse of Human Rights among Families of Missing
Persons
All family-association representatives I have interviewed agree that there is an ethnic
polarization among the family associations. One interviewee said that the respect and
understanding for one another that family-association representatives had gained by
interacting at the leadership level was fragile and had not filtered down to ordinary
association members. No multi-ethnic family associations exist, either locally or
nationally. In fact, in many places several family associations exist side by side without
trying to join forces, although some do cooperate on a minor scale.99 Their mono-
ethnicity, the nature of the specific events that made them associate, their sometimes
strongly conflicting interests, the creation and fractioning of umbrella organizations,
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and all the emotions these circumstances evoke make family associations prone to
develop bonding social capital based on the ethnic discourse. In spite of this, they keep
coming back to each other, keep trying to settle hurt feelings, keep trying to cooperate
and develop bridging social capital. There has been great progress, but there have also
been major setbacks because rationality, in the common sense of the word, has
frequently been overruled by emotional reactions. These reactions should not be seen
as simply irrational; there is a rationale and logic behind them that is difficult to
overcome with reason. I therefore prefer to conceptualize this as emotional rationality,
to put it on par with other kinds of rationality.
The majority of surviving family members are women, many of whom, before the
war, were housewives and led traditional women lives, their main responsibility
being to provide for well-being within the family. This applies across ethnicities to all
family associations, but a number of Bosniak family associations, especially the
Srebrenica-related ones, have turned it into an asset, achieving moral authority for
their case by stressing their roles as women, as wives and mothers of innocent
civilians, in the names of their organizations and in their way of presenting themselves
as victims.100 The various familial relations of surviving relatives to their missing
family members, and whether the missing person was a (by definition innocent)
civilian or a (implicitly not so innocent) soldier, produces certain status differences
that are emotionally hard to overcome. However, whereas dying in battle is an
occupational risk of being a soldier, going missing is not. Relatives of missing soldiers
do not suffer from the loss of a soldier but from the loss of a husband, father, son, or
brother; these families have the same right to know the fate and whereabouts of their
loved ones as anyone else, which is exactly why the termmissing person, in the Law on
Missing Persons, includes all categories of persons unaccounted for, civilians and
soldiers alike.101
That the missing are unaccounted for as the result of a criminal act also creates
status differences among family members. The criminal act in question may vary from
the gravest of crimes—genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes—to the lesser
crime of failing to secure and provide information on the identity, fate, and burial place
of a combatant. Because the perpetrators are ethnic others, and because the crimes, in
terms of severity and magnitude, are unequally distributed across ethnicities, the
problem acquires a collective dimension, producing status differences between ethnic
groups as well as among family associations. The collective identity easily comes to
overpower the individual identity, the ethnic discourse to overrule the human-rights
discourse. In the legal system, these crimes are hierarchically categorized according to
their severity, and punishment is to be measured out proportionately. Family
members’ right to know cannot be categorized in the same way; it applies equally to
all family members, regardless of which crime is suspected to have led to the
disappearance. This is an important notion that is nevertheless very hard to cope with
emotionally—especially because families are pursuing not only truth about what
happened but also criminal justice for their victims, and because establishing this
truth feeds into the pursuit of justice. It is important to remember that exhumations
are carried out under the jurisdiction of the courts, and that the exhumation site is in
fact a crime scene. This applies even when the primary purpose is to recover mortal
remains for identification and repatriation and not to provide evidence for court
procedures.
The lack of an explicitly formulated common strategy based on a human-rights
discourse puts family associations in danger of being sucked into politics and being
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exploited by divisive ethnic entrepreneurs, particularly because most family members
have no pre-war experience of organizational life in terms of dealing either with
authorities or with the media. They have had to go through a steep learning curve. To
raise public awareness of their specific case, they all depend on media attention, which
they attract to different degrees. Croat family associations and Bosniak family
associations other than the Srebrenica associations seem to attract the least, but most
sober, attention, predominantly in connection with exhumations, burials, anniver-
saries, commemorations, and court procedures. Most media exposed, and consequently
most in danger of being carried away by the ethnic discourse of external actors, are the
Srebrenica and RS family associations.
Clashes between Different Perceptions of Reality: The Identification
Process
The ICMP made its first DNA match between blood and bone samples in November
2001. It has since perfected its DNA identification methods, which are now state of
the art, incredibly time efficient and with increasingly more capacity. As odontology
cannot be used for identification in BiH because of a lack of dental records,
identification was originally based predominantly on anthropological evidence in
combination with recognition of clothes and personal items by family members. The
number of identifications based on these methods would have remained modest
relative to the total number of missing persons; unidentified corpses had already
begun to pile up, and the situation required a resolution. Without ICMP’s unique
research and development achievements with the DNA method, which would not have
been possible in earlier days, resolving the missing persons issue would have been
a completely different matter, requiring completely different solutions to almost all
aspects of the issue.
However, DNA analysts are scientists, not magicians. They cannot provide
answers unless they have all the necessary variables. Some problems, such as not
being able to extract quality DNA material from submitted bone samples, may
be solved scientifically. Most problems, however, seem to be caused by distrust arising
out of a classical expert–layperson dilemma, the experts having difficulty in getting
information across to lay people who perceive things from their own point of view,
intricately mixed with the prevailing ethnic discourse. The lack of matching blood
references for the 3,115 found, recovered, and DNA-profiled missing persons
mentioned above is a huge problem. To some extent, it may simply be that there are
no surviving relatives, or that only non-genetically related family members have
survived. Unfortunately, however, despite intensive blood collection campaigns and
public appeals, the major problem seems to be that blood relatives fail, or refuse, to
provide blood samples for identification purposes. One reason may be the emotional
dilemma involved—donating a blood sample may be perceived as equivalent to giving
up hope of one’s missing relatives being still alive. Another reason, however, is that
people do not understand two essential variables of the process: the necessity of having
the right combination of blood samples in relation to the submitted bone samples to
make a DNA match, and the fact that there is a proportionality between the number of
samples submitted and the number of identifications obtained—one of the topics
discussed at both the Eighth and Ninth Regional Family Association Networking
Conferences in 2005 and 2006.
The lack of matching reference blood samples is a problem among all ethnonational
groups.102 However, distrust seems most pronounced among RS families. Although the
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DNA-processing system has been carefully designed to be absolutely blind, and despite
efforts to explain the process and the system, Serb family-association representatives
suspect it of being ethnically biased and of deliberately discriminating against them.
They argue that fewer DNA matching reports are received by Serbs and Croats than
by Bosniaks, that Srebrenica victims are prioritized (5,332 identifications made as of
28 March 2008), and that many family members who donated blood samples years ago
have not yet received any answers on the fate of their missing relatives. Incidents such
as the case of the husband of the president of the RS Board—exchanged and buried
unidentified in 1994, exhumed and stored in a Republika Srpska facility since 1998,
and not identified until spring 2007—have not helped to produce more trust in the
process.103 As the problems in this case seem to have resulted mostly from a lack of
transparency and coordination among different agencies performing various steps in
the process, it could have shifted attitudes in favor of the MPI BiH, which is supposed
to streamline the process in the future by applying precise rules and policies regulating
the exhumation, examination, and identification processes. However, the ethnic
discourse seems to be too strong. Despite the clear public attitude of the Serb co-
director of the MPI BiH that the institute will be of benefit in the recovery and
identification of Serb victims, the president of the RS Organization and former head of
the RS Office wants to ‘‘return the entire BiH MPI establishment to its very
beginning.’’104
Considering the former argument, first of all, in total there are simply fewer
missing Serbs and Croats than missing Bosniaks. Furthermore, so far the search and
recovery process has been ethnically divided, with the Federal Commission responsible
for Bosniak and Croat missing persons and the RS Office for Serb missing persons. The
ratio of bone samples submitted by the RS Office to those submitted by the Federal
Commission (about 1:11) does not reflect the proportion either of registered or of found
and recovered missing Serbs to missing non-Serbs (between 1:5 and 1:6). What it does
reflect are the relative activity levels of the two commissions, which in turn reflect the
financial resources allocated to the search and recovery process by the respective
entity governments.105 Who is identified and repatriated depends above all on whose
mortal remains are recovered. Rather than suspecting biases in the identification
process, Serb families of missing persons could have addressed this issue and
questioned the priorities of their own political authorities. Unfortunately, their
justified frustrations and their fear of being under-prioritized in the MPI BiH as well
have taken an increasingly ethnically discursive tone, including, among other things,
unfortunate comparisons of their own victimization with the victimization of other
family groups—accentuated by the lengthy and heavily politicized dispute over the so-
called Sarajevo Commission, which has been ongoing since 2004 and has so far
produced no results.106
Clashes between Different Perceptions of Reality: The Search and
Recovery Process
Whereas the DNA identification process can be designed to be anonymous, the search
and recovery process, by its very nature, cannot. To succeed in locating clandestine
graves, one needs to known as precisely as possible for whom one is looking. Obviously,
not all graves containing missing persons can be exhumed simultaneously. It has
taken more than ten years to exhume about half the missing, and it may take another
five to ten years to find and recover the rest. From a historical perspective, this will be
a truly noteworthy achievement. However, life expectancy, not history, is the families’
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frame of reference: they fear they will not get an answer before they die. From this
perspective, when one has already waited ten or fifteen years, waiting another ten
years for an answer is very different from waiting another year. In total, the waiting
may make up as much as one-third of a lifetime, and both the professionals and
the families know very well that a number of missing persons will never be found
or identified. Families cannot be certain that the outcome will be an answer, and, of
course, no one will volunteer to wait in uncertainty. In addition, despite efforts to
develop and start using scientific search methods, witness information is still the most
important means of locating gravesites and determining what to expect when opening
a grave. This adds another aspect to the time factor. Potential witnesses may
be surviving victims, perpetrators, or bystanders; the incitement to conceal may be
stronger than the incitement to reveal information that can lead to finding missing
persons. Even if they want to give information, they may be threatened or intimidated
into silence, with negative consequences for the search for missing persons. The
passing of time may have both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand,
witnesses may eventually be induced to come forward with the information they
possess; on the other hand, important witnesses may die without having revealed their
knowledge. This whole situation, in addition to the above-mentioned conflicts,
illustrates how immensely important the criteria for deciding upon how to prioritize
the order of search and recovery will become, as well as the huge conflicts the planning
of exhumation seasons may create. This prioritization may be one of the biggest risk
factors to be encountered by the new institute, and it may make or break the success of
institutional and intergroup trust-building.
Criteria for prioritizing search and recovery must be perceived as fair and impartial
by families of all ethnicities; this may be difficult to achieve, and to achieve it one may
have to decide upon criteria that may very well not be the most efficient in terms of
either time or costs. From my purely professional point of view as an archeologist, the
most time- and cost-efficient course of action is to concentrate on and finish one complex
of graves at a time. To see the graves in their context would make the work on each
grave easier and allow the excavators to better reveal the pattern of events. In the case
of complexes comprising both primary and secondary graves and containing dissociated
and commingled human remains, such as those related to the Srebrenica genocide, it
would also ease thework in subsequent phases of the process: the re-association of bones
from the same individual found in several graves, as well as the identification process. It
would furthermore lessen the emotional stress on families caused by having to bury
partial bodies or reopen burials in order to add additional remains identified later.
However, what professionals judge to be efficiency gains may appear different to
families, given the ethnic discourse that still prevails. Whatever criteria are decided on
in the end, it is essential that they be acceptable to the families and that Advisory Board
members participate in the decision process. The paradox is that in order to avoid
discrimination and create the perception among the families of missing persons of a
process that is just to all, decision makers may have to take discriminating factors into
account when planning search and recovery operations. One thing that it is not wise to
do, however, is to exhume one grave in one locality one year, another grave in the same
locality the next year, and perhaps a third grave the third year—even if this serves the
purpose of keeping up awareness among local and international notabilities and
potential donors.107 From a professional point of view, this is inefficient, and from a
humanitarian point of view, it only prolongs the whole painful process, both for local
communities and for the families whose missing relatives are buried in those graves.
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Conclusions
The establishment and implementation of the Law on Missing Persons and the MPI
BiH, based on principles of international humanitarian law and human rights,
represent an increase of societal safety in BiH. However, there is no guarantee that
this issue will automatically be followed up by the MPI BiH in its operational phase
unless specific attention is paid to it. It is a paradox that the Missing Persons Institute
was created to be a trust-building institution, but cannot function without itself being
trusted. This trust has been difficult to build. An instrumental rationality has been
used to create the institutional and organizational frameworks and best practice
operational standards that are needed to develop the qualities that promote
institutional trust; a communicative rationality has been employed in an effort to
ensure that the chosen solutions are commonly accepted by all actors involved. Far
from being sequential and linear, however, as theoretically assumed, in reality the
process has been spiraling forward, with many sidetracking and trust-destroying
setbacks. The art has been to prevent the loops backward from becoming bigger than
the loops forward. It is a paradox that consensus-seeking processes are necessary to
build both institutional and intergroup trust but, when they draw out indefinitely,
become trust destroying. This applies also in the present case. Consensus-seeking
processes are difficult and time consuming—the more so the further apart the
interested parties are and the less willing they are to compromise. The prevailing
ethnic discourse, particularly in the political system, has made almost every decision
along the way a truly cumbersome affair. The interested parties have been, and still
are, quite far apart on a number of issues, and the noble art of compromise is not held
in the greatest esteem. Because all board decisions within the MPI BiH are to be made
by consensus, this dilemma will likely persist, clashing with the demand for efficiency
and the goal of speeding up the resolution of the missing-persons issue.
The MPI BiH has the potential to mobilize the critical mass of people that is
needed to create a positive reputational cascade effect, changing the public discourse
from an ethnic discourse to a human-rights discourse. Within the MPI BiH, however,
the human-rights discourse must compete with an ethnic discourse embedded in the
very structure of the institute. This is partly unavoidable, since the institute’s
structure must comply with the consociational constitution of the BiH. Furthermore,
the human-rights discourse must compete with the emotional rationality of the
families of missing persons, which builds predominantly on the ethnic discourse.
Despite sincere efforts to build bridging social capital among themselves, they are still
prone to develop bonding social capital exploitable by divisive ethnic entrepreneurs.
In addition, the directors of the MPI BiH have to some extend been stranded with the
ethnically based practices of the former entity-level commissions. Since the directors
are the institute’s public face, in terms of trustworthiness, it is vitally important that
they not bring these practices with them into the new institute but follow a common
path and see to it that their staff do the same. They should settle their disputes among
themselves, within the walls of the institute, rather than in public.
The families’ emotional rationality feeds into a classical expert-versus-layperson
dilemma. Solid facts that are perceived as self-explanatory by experts, such as the
results of DNA analysis, are perceived differently by the families of the missing, who
interpret the facts according to their own perception of reality. To put it simply, they
have different frames of reference that create communication problems and lead to
distrust. The professionals’ historical time reference also clashes with the families’
time reference (i.e., their own lifespan); what looks like a success from a historical
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perspective may seem a failure from a lifetime perspective. While professionals count
bodies found and identified, families count their still-missing family members.
In principle, professionals are not concerned about when particular missing
individuals are recovered, as long as the recovery process is efficient and progresses
steadily; to the families, when makes all the difference. Time- and cost-efficient
recovery procedures may clash with families’ perceptions of fairness and impartiality,
making the criteria for deciding on the order of priority of exhumations/excavations
a crucial trust-building factor.
In order to balance all these dilemmas, additional trust-building measures may
be needed. Otherwise, contrary to intentions, the measures already employed
may become trust destroying, the human-rights discourse the loser, and societal
safety a fiction.
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